With the rapid booming of intelligent traffic system, vehicular ad hoc networks have attracted wide attention from both academic and industry. However, security is the main obstacle for the wide deployment of vehicular ad hoc networks. Vehicular ad hoc networks security has two critical issues: access authentication and privacy preservation. How to ensure privacy preservation and improve the efficiency of authentication has become the urgent needs. However, the existing access authentication schemes for vehicular ad hoc networks with different flaws cannot maintain the balance between security and efficiency. Thus, an anonymous access authentication scheme for vehicular ad hoc networks under edge computing based on ID-based short group signature mechanism is proposed in this article to improve the efficiency and anonymity of access authentication. Multiple pseudonyms are presented to preserve the privacy of vehicle node. Besides, a new method is designed to identify and revoke malicious vehicles in the evaluation manner. The core protocols of the proposed scheme are proved to be secure by SVO logic. According to the computation cost and transmission overhead analysis, we indicate that our scheme owns better performance. Moreover, in this article, we combine vehicular ad hoc networks with edge computing together to provide a new clue for the development of mobile edge computing.
Introduction
The increasing requirement for improving security and privacy for user has brought wide interest on anonymous access authentication for vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). The VANETs, a type of wireless mesh network (WMN 1 ), are designed for car interconnection communication under roadside infrastructures. 2 The rapid advances in intelligent vehicles and cloud computing technologies in recent years motivate researchers to investigate a new concept of edge computing. 3 As a new paradigm, edge computing works between the cloud and the terminal nodes, which enables to take full advantage of cloud computing, thereby providing vehicles with powerful computing resources and useful services. 4, 5 Different from cloud computing in the data center, edge computing can furthest promote the computing capabilities of terminal. In VANETs, the high mobility of vehicles and massive data from data center make the real-time communication hard under the common cloud computing environment. 6, 7 Edge computing can move the large amount of calculating pressure from the vehicle terminal to the roadside infrastructure (edge computing node), 8, 9 which is thus considered to be an ideal solution to the computational-cost process in VANETs during access authentication. However, few solutions are focused on the combination of access authentication with edge computing in VANETs.
1. Vehicles own strong computing ability and rich storage capacity. 2. VANETs are more constant and stable than other ad hoc networks, due to the movements of the vehicles on the same direction are foreseeable.
However, the current technology of VANETs is still not mature enough and facing many security challenges such as access authentication, privacy preservation, traceability, unlinkability, and identification and revocation of malicious nodes.
In the aspect of security mechanisms for VANETs, access authentication and privacy preservation have been paid more and more attentions. How to construct concrete scheme of access authentication and privacy preservation has become a hotspot. 13 
Related work
In previous years, some scholars have proposed a number of typical anonymous-certificates-based schemes [14] [15] [16] for VANETs. There is no doubt that the utilization of certificates improves the efficiency of verification. However, with high overhead of certificate management as well as key distribution and management, all of the proposals are not suitable for deploying VANETs in a large scale. Furthermore, some schemes have a high requirement of OBU storage. Instead, several groupsignature-based VANETs authentication schemes [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] are proposed. Depending on group signature mechanisms, the authentication schemes may eradicate the high certificate management overhead and preserve the user privacy. In addition, each group member is able to sign the message to represent for the group. Thus, the adversary may not identify the signer according to the signed message. Nevertheless, once the number of vehicles increases dramatically, the packet loss rate is increased simultaneously. In recent years, ID-based cryptography (IBC) is put forward as a rising form of public key cryptography. 22 The most important ascendancy of IBC is that it streamlines the key management burden compared to traditional certificate-based public key systems. 23 A number of identity-based authentication solutions for VANETs are then put forward. [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] But, there are still no mature solutions for VANETs to guarantee both security and high efficiency. In addition, the schemes have defects in preserving privacy and identifying and revoking malicious node. Moreover, few access authentication schemes combining edge computing with VANETs have been proposed. Different from the above reported schemes, we have published an article 31 in IMIS 2017: an anonymous access authentication scheme (AAAS) for VANETs Based on identity-based short group signature (ISGS), 32 which could ensure efficient access authentication and strong privacy preservation. In this article, a novel AAAS for VANETs under edge computing based on ISGS mechanism is proposed, which could achieve efficient access authentication and formidable privacy preservation. Besides, in this article, we extend the paper 31 published in IMIS 2017 and combine access authentication with edge computing together with security proof as well as more comprehensive performance analysis. Specifically, the major contributions of this article are fivefold:
1. An AAAS for VANETs under edge computing is proposed, in which the usage of identity-based group signature and multiple pseudonyms can provide strong privacy preservation for users. 2. We design a new VANETs framework combining with edge computing, in which, RSUs play the role of edge computing nodes and the computation burden of OBUs is thus reduced. 3. We present a new identification and revocation approach of malicious node through evaluation mechanism. 4. The security analysis is carried out to indicate that our proposed scheme may meet the security and privacy needs in VANETs. In addition, the security proof of the fundamental protocols is presented through Syverson-Van Oorschot (SVO) logic. 5. Finally, the analysis of computation cost, transmission overhead, and serving ratio are performed to illustrate that our scheme performs better in both V2I and V2V authentication compared with previously proposed schemes for VANETs.
The rest of this article is arranged as given below. Section ''Preliminaries'' elaborates the related preliminaries. In section ''The proposed anonymous authentication scheme,'' we introduce the trust model, security requirements, and the details of the proposed access authentication scheme. The security proof of the fundamental protocols and formal security analysis are given out in section ''Security proof and analysis.'' In section ''Performance analysis,'' the comparisons of performance analysis are carried out. Finally, the conclusion is drawn in section ''Conclusion.''
Preliminaries
We utilize CC signature mechanism for authentication between OBUs and RSUs, and ISGS mechanism for authentication among OBUs. The corresponding cryptography building blocks will be presented in this section.
Bilinear pairing
The bilinear pairing e : G 1 3 G 1 ! G 2 holds the following features. And, the given G 1 is an additive group and G 2 is a multiplicative group with prime order p, where p = q n , q is prime and n 2 Z + :
1. Bilinearity. The pairing e : G 1 3 G 1 ! G 2 is said to be bilinear if the equation e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q) ab holds with 8P, Q 2 G 1 and
then e(P, P) is an element of G 2 , and P is a generator in G 1 . 3. Computability. The bilinear pairing e : G 1 3 G 1 ! G 2 can be efficiently computed.
In this scheme, elliptic curve-based mathematical hard problem in cryptography is also involved:
ECDLP (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm
Problem). For randomly selected points P, Q on elliptic curve E, it is difficult to compute an integer x satisfying Q = xP.
CDHP
(Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem). It is difficult to calculate abP according the given P, aP, and bP, where a, b 2 Z 1. CC Setup. Given the bilinear pairing e : G 1 3 G 1 ! G 2 of prime order q, where P is a generator of G 1 . Randomly choose s 2 Z Ã q as the system master key and set P pub = sP. 
CC Verify. In order to verify d, the receiver examines the equation e(P pub , U + hQ ID )? = e(P, V ), if it holds, d is valid, or else d is invalid.
ISGS
The ISGS was proposed by Song et al., 33 which is based on bilinear pairing and designed to guarantee the privacy preservation of group members. The specific algorithm are as below: 
where n = pq. 4. U i gets the private key pair hb i , sk i i. 
The proposed anonymous authentication scheme
In this article, we extend the paper 31 to combine VANETs anonymous access authentication with edge computing and propose a novel AAAS for VANETs under edge computing (AAAS). In this section, we mainly introduce the detail of the proposed authentication scheme.
Trust model and assumptions
The general VANETs consist of three types of network entities: OBU, RSU (edge node), and TA.
The trust model of the proposed scheme is shown in Figure 2 . TA is one-way trusted to both RSU and OBU. TA and RSU are connected through a secure wired channel, while RSU and OBU communicate over the wireless channel and distrust to each other. Amid OBUs, they correspond via ad hoc and do not trust each other. Suppose that the TA is entirely trusted and that only TA can modify the information in the TPD integrated on the OBU.
We assume that the adversary only has the common attack capabilities, such as impersonation, tampering, replay, and key-stealing attack.
Security requirements
As a public transportation network, VANETs face many security issues. In order to achieve the purpose of anonymous authentication, VANETs must meet the following security requirements: identity of OBU to prevent the node utilizing anonymous identity to escape responsibility. 4. Unlinkability. The unlinkability is that the adversary cannot tell the different messages from the same OBU. 5. Identification and revocation of malicious nodes.
Identifying and revoking malicious nodes is a key issue in VANETs. When some nodes fail, for example, sensors are manipulated, keys are extracted and used for spoofing messages, or other malicious behavior occurs, the system must be able to identify and remove these malicious nodes to avoid the potential security threats. 6. Resistance of typical attacks. The system should also be able to defend some common attacks such as impersonation, tampering, replay, and key-stealing attack.
The proposed scheme in this article try to meet the above requirements to be a complete solution.
AAAS
The AAAS proposed in this article is based ISGS to achieve the purpose of anonymous authentication. AAAS comprises five parts: System initialization, Registration, V2I authentication protocol, V2V authentication protocol, and Identification and revocation of malicious nodes. The notations and acronyms throughout this article are described as Table 1 .
System initialization. During system initialization, TA generates and publishes the public parameters as below:
1. TA opts for two large primes p, q and a elliptic curve E :
TA generates cyclic groups G 1 and G 2 with prime order q and a bilinear pairing e :
TA randomly selects a generator P 2 G 1 and s 2 Z Ã q as the system master key, then calculates the system public key P pub = sP. 4. TA selects four hash functions H: f0, 1g
. TA publishes the system public parameters param = fp, q, e, P, P pub , H, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 g.
Registration.
For the purpose of achieving mutual authentication, OBU and RSU should register to TA:
(a) Registration of OBU: The ith pseudonym/the ith random number of OBU b i =sk i
Group signing key pair K AÀB
The shared key between entity A and entity B N The trust value of OBU Enc BF PK A (M)
Using entity A's PK A to encrypt message M through BF 34 mechanism Enc K(M)
Using shared key K to encrypt message M through symmetric encryption mechanism Sign CC SK A (M)
Using entity A's SK A to sign message M through CC mechanism Sign ISGS GSK A (M)
Using entity A's GSK A to sign message M through ISGS mechanism OBU: on-board unit; RSU: roadside unit.
and calculates Pk g = s g P as the group public key. 3. TA sends fs R , Q IDR , s g , Pk g g to RSU over the secure channel. 4. RSU saves fs R , Q IDR , s g , Pk g g locally.
V2I authentication protocol. The V2I authentication protocol between OBU and RSU is executed when the mobile OBU moves to the wireless communication range of the accessed RSU. RSU is playing the role of edge node which owns richer computational power than OBU. During V2I authentication, we try to shift the large computational pressures from OBU to RSU to gain a better overall performance. As shown in Figure 3 , the authentication protocol is composed of following steps:
checks the freshness of TS 1 . If TS 1 is fresh, OBU continues to verify d 1 by checking e(P, V RSU )? = e(P pub , U RSU + h RSU Q IDR ). If the equation holds, RSU is regarded as a legal one. Otherwise, OBU rejects to access the RSU. OBU then computes
. OBU computes K vÀr = Pk g r OBU = s R Pr OBU and c = E K rÀv fV ID g. 4. OBU sends fc, d 2 , r OBU P, TS 2 g to RSU. 5. After getting the message from OBU, RSU checks if TS 2 is fresh. If it is fresh, RSU calculates the shared key K rÀv = r OBU Ps R = r OBU Pk g and exploits K rÀv to decrypt c to obtain V ID . Afterward, RSU checks e(P, V OBU )? = e(P pub , U OBU + h OBU Q IDV ). Then, OBU will be taken as a legal node if the equation holds. Otherwise RSU refuses to supply access service to the OBU. RSU randomly selects
, sk i = s R Q Vi . RSU chooses T as the valid period of the group signing key and calculates c 1 = E K rÀv fhsk i , V i , T ig. 6. RSU sends c 1 back to OBU. 7. After getting c 1 , OBU decrypts c 1 to obtain
stored in the TPD and the V2I authentication is completed.
Hence, we can see that edge computing has the unique feature to reduce the calculating pressure of vehicle terminal to guarantee the users demand for real-time authentication.
V2V authentication protocol. After V2I authentication, the accessed legal OBUs get their pseudonyms and group signing key pairs. Thus, OBUs may certificate each other for secure communication, which is known as V2V authentication. As shown in Figure 4 , the V2V authentication (between OBU i and OBU j ) is triggered as the following steps:
1. OBU i chooses pseudonym V i , group signing key pair hsk i , b i i and random verifies the signature
, and g = e(A i , H(Pk g jjTS i , A i )), checks the equation b? = ag. If the equation holds, OBU j chooses random x OBU j 2 Z Ã q and calculates the shared key K vÀv = A i r OBU j = r OBU i Pr OBU j , then stores it in the TPD. After that, OBU j chooses a pseudonym V j , a group signing key pair hsk j , b j i and computes
If the equation holds, OBU i calculates the shared key K vÀv = A j r OBU i = r OBU j Pr OBU i and stores it in the TPD. V2V authentication is thus finished.
Identification and revocation of malicious nodes. The identification and revocation of malicious nodes is a major challenge for VANETs. The process in this article is shown in Figure 5 below:
1. When a node OBU j accounts a message m sent by OBU i as a malicious message, it generates a report, which contains V i and m. 2. OBU j sends the report to the neighbor RSU. 3. After receiving a report, RSU transmits the report to TA through the secure channel. 4. After getting a report from RSU, TA first checks whether m is a malicious message. If it is, TA traces the real identity of OBU i according to
, where 
Security proof and analysis
Formal security analysis and proof of security for the proposed core protocols will be presented in this section. First, we will use SVO logic 35 to prove the security of the fundamental protocols. Then the further security analysis will be provided to prove that our scheme may satisfy the security requirements described in section ''The proposed anonymous authentication scheme.''
Foundation of SVO logic
SVO logic is more intuitive, convenient, and practical than other logic analysis methods in the following aspects:
1. The axioms in SVO can be adjusted or extended easily to meet the security proof needs rather than Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) 36 or other logical approaches. 2. SVO is detailed and legible, which helps to accurately express the actual meaning of the protocol, thus avoid the misunderstandings. 3. SVO is rigorous and reliable, and the semantics is clear. SVO axiom. For any subject P and Q, the sum of the formulas u and c has the following axiom:
1. Believes: Ax1: P believes u^P believes (u ' c) ' P believes c. Ax2: P believes u ' P believes(P believes u). 2. Source association: Ax3: SharedKey(K, P, Q)^R recieved fX
Ax7: P received (X 1 , . . . , X n ) ' P receives X i . Ax8: P received fX g K^P sees K À1 ' P recieves X . Ax9: P received ½X K ' P received X . 5. Seeing: Ax10: P received X ' P sees X . Ax11: P sees (X 1 , . . . , X n ) ' P sees X i . Ax12: P sees X 1^. . .^P sees F(X 1 , . . . , X n ). 6. Comprehending:
Ax 13: P believes (P sees F(X )) ' P believes (P sees X ). 7. Saying:
Ax14:
Ax16: P controls u^P says u ' c. 9. Freshness:
Ax19: fresh(X )^P said X ' P says X . 11. Symmetric goodness of shared keys: Ax20: SharedKey (K, P, Q)[SharedKey (K, Q, P).
SVO objectives. The following SVO objectives are given according to the security requirements of our scheme to prove the security of V2I and V2V protocols: 
Security proof of the authentication protocols
Initial assumptions. In order to prove the security of V2I and V2V protocols, first, the assumptions are given below:
1. Assumptions of V2I protocol: P1: OBU believes PK s (TA, P Pub ).
RSU believes PK s (TA, P Pub ).
RSU believes PK d (RSU, s R P). P5: OBU believes fresh (TS 2 ).
RSU believes fresh (TS 1 ). P6: OBU believes OBU sees (r OBU P).
RSU believes RSU sees (s R P).
Ã r OBU ). P10: OBU believes (OBU said fhV i , sk i igK vÀr ).
RSU believes (RSU said fV ID gK vÀr ). P11: OBU believes ((TA said (RSU, Q IDR )) ' TA said PK s (RSU, Q IDR )). RSU believes ((TA said (OBU, Q IDV )) ' TA said PK s (OBU , Q IDV )).
Assumptions of V2V protocol:
P12: OBU i believes PK s (RSU, Pk g ). OBU j believes PK s (RSU, Pk g ).
OBU j believes PK d (OBU j , (TS j , Pk g ) ' r OBU j P). P16: OBU i believes fresh (TS i ).
OBU j believes fresh (TS j ). P17: OBU i believes OBU i sees ((TS j , Pk g ) ' r OBU j P).
OBU j believes OBU j sees ((TS j , Pk g ) ' r OBU j P).
Security proof of V2I authentication protocol. From the assumptions, we can get: S1: Obtain from P1, P2, P11, Ax1, Ax14, and Nec. OBU believes TA said PK s (RSU, Pk g ). S2: Obtain from S1, P3, and Ax1. OBU believes PK s (RSU, Q IDR ). S3: Obtain from P7, P9, and Ax7.
OBU received fTS 1 , s R PgQ IDRÀ1 . S4: Obtain from S2, S3, P2, Ax4, Ax14, and Nec.
OBU believes RSU said s R P. S5: Obtain from P5, P7, Ax1, Ax9, and Ax17.
OBU believes fresh s R P. S6: Obtain from S4, S5, Ax1, Ax19, and Nec.
OBU believes RSU says s R P. S7: Obtain from P8, Ax1, Ax1, Ax7, and Nec.
OBU believes OBU received fhV i , sk i igK vÀr . S8: Obtain from S2, S7, P4, P9, and Ax1. OBU believes PK s (RSU, Ã s R ). S9: Obtain from S8, P4, Ax1, Ax5, and Nec.
OBU believes SharedKey (K vÀr , OBU , RSU) for
S10: Obtain from P8, P6, Ax1, Ax10, Ax11, Ax12, and Nec. OBU believes OBU sees K vÀr . S11: Obtained from the definitions of S9, S10, Ax1, and SharedKey (K À , A, B). OBU believes SharedKey (K vÀr À , OBU, RSU) (G2 is proved). S12: Obtain from S5, Ax18 (G4 is proved).
OBU believes fresh K vÀr . S13: As defined by S3, S12, P10, Ax1, and Confirm P(X ). OBU believes SharedKey (K vÀr + , OBU , RSU) (G3 is proved). S14: Obtain from S7, S10, Ax1, Ax8, and Nec.
OBU believes fresh hV i , sk i i. S15: Obtain from P10, S13, S14, and Ax13.
OBU believes RSU said hV i , sk i i. S16: Obtain from S14, S15, Ax19, and Nec.
OBU believes RSU says hV i , sk i i (G1 is proved).
The SVO object of RSU can also be proved similar as OBU. According to the security proof presented above, we can prove that the V2I authentication protocol is secure.
Security proof of V2V authentication protocol. From the assumptions, we can get: S1: Obtain from P12, P13, P22, Ax1, Ax14, and Nec. OBU i believes RSU said PK s (OBU j , V j ). S2: Obtain from S1, P14, and Ax1.
OBU i believes PK s (OBU j , V j ). S3: Obtain from P18, P20, and Ax7.
OBU i received fTS j , Pk g gV À1 j . S4: Obtain from S2, S3, P13, Ax4, Ax14, and Nec.
OBU i believes OBU j said r OBU j P. S5: Obtain from P16, P18, Ax1, Ax9, and Ax17.
OBU i believes fresh r OBU j P. S6: Obtain from S4, S5, Ax1, Ax19, and Nec.
OBU i believes OBU j says r OBU j P (G5 is proved). S7: Obtain from P19, Ax1, Ax1, Ax7, and Nec.
OBU i believes OBU i received r OBU j P. S8: Obtain from S2, S7, P15, P9 and Ax1.
OBU i believes PK s (OBU j , V j ). S9: Obtain from S8, P15, Ax1, Ax5, Nec.
OBU i believes SharedKey (K vÀv , OBU i , OBU j ) for K vÀv = F 0 (r OBU i , Ã r OBU j ). S10: Obtain from P19, P17, Ax1, Ax10, Ax11, Ax12, and Nec. OBU i believes OBU i sees K vÀv . S11: Obtain from the definitions of S9, S10, Ax1, and SharedKey (K À , A, B) (G6 is proved). OBU i believes SharedKey (K vÀv À , OBU i , OBU j ). S12: Obtain from S5 and Ax18. OBU i believes fresh K vÀv (G7 is proved).
The SVO object of OBU j is able to be proved similar as OBU i . According to the security proof presented in this subsection, we can prove that the V2V authentication protocol is secure.
Security analysis
We carry out the security analysis from the following aspects in terms of the security requirements:
1. Access authentication. Mutual authentication for OBU to RSU (V2I) and OBU to OBU (V2V) communications are provided in the proposed scheme. Section ''Security proof and analysis'' has given the formal security proof of the authentication protocols. 2. Anonymity. In the V2I authentication, OBU employs anonymous identity issued by TA. While in the V2V authentication, OBU randomly chooses a pseudonym issued by RSU. Therefore, in the worst case, if multiple RSUs are compromised, the adversary cannot reveal the real identity of OBU. Besides, other compromised OBUs cannot obtain the real identity through the random pseudonym of the right OBU. Thus, the user's privacy is well protected in the proposed scheme. 3. Traceability. Once the true identity of vehicle needs to be revealed, TA can calculate its real identity according to the communication pseudonyms of the vehicle, and the detailed introduction is given in section ''Identification and revocation of malicious nodes.'' 4. Unlinkability. After OBU accessing to a RSU, the RSU issues multiple pseudonyms for the OBU. OBU randomly chooses a pseudonym as anonymous identity during later V2V authentication procedure, the adversary cannot tell that several messages are sent by the same OBU. 5. Malicious node identification and revocation. As described in section ''Identification and revocation of malicious nodes,'' the AAAS provides an approach to identify and revoke malicious nodes based on the evaluation mechanism. 6. Resistance of typical attacks. Our scheme can also resist impersonation attack, tampering attack, replay attack, and key-stealing attack: Impersonation attack. During V2I authentication, the OBU and RSU exploit CC signature, where the public keys and private keys are calculated by TA. Thus, the adversary cannot impersonate other nodes to forge a legitimate signature.
Tampering attack. According to AAAS, after the V2I and V2V authentication, the entities (RSU or OBU) can generate a shared key to encrypt the subsequent communication message. It is impossible for the adversary to tamper with the communication message since it does not know the shared key. Replay attack. During V2I and V2V authentication, the current time stamp TS i is attached to the signed message, which can effectively prevent replay attack. Key-stealing attack. During registration phase, we assume that TA issues keys to OBU and RSU through secure channel. As for V2I authentication, RSU encrypts the group signing keys and the anonymous identities with the shared key k rÀv as c 1 = E K rÀv (\ski, Vi, T.). Furthermore, OBU stores private keys and shared keys in TPD, which is assumed absolutely secure. So, we can conclude that our AAAS can effectively prevent key-stealing attack either in key distributing or storing process.
From the above analysis, we can see that the proposed scheme (AAAS) can meet the security requirements described in section ''The proposed anonymous authentication scheme.'' Thus, the proposed AAAS is considered to be complete.
Performance analysis
The performance analysis of the proposed scheme (AAAS) is elaborated from three aspects: computation cost, transmission overhead, and serving ratio. Besides, the comparison analysis is presented among AAAS, CPAS, 30 ACPN, 27 and PACP. 37 
Computation cost
Computation cost is the amount of computations made by related network entities during the V2I and V2V authentication procedure. With the deployment of edge computing, the computation cost on RSU side is not critical since RSU usually owes rich computation resource. Thus, in this section, we mainly give the comparison analysis of computation cost on vehicle side among different schemes. The main operations involved in the authentication of the schemes includes: bilinear pairing, hash-to-point, encryption, point addition, and point multiplication. Compared with the above operations, the cost of hash, point addition, and symmetric encryption can be neglected. In order to facilitate the expression, Table 2 presents the symbols and execution time (in milliseconds) for a curve with k = 6 and 160-bit q. The execution platform is a Intel Pentium IV 3.0-GHz machine. During V2I authentication of AAAS, OBU verifies the CC signature by checking e(P, V RSU )? = e(P pub , U RSU + h RSU Q IDR ) and generates the CC signature as U OBU r OBU Q IDV , V OBU = (r OBU + h OBU )s V , and h OBU = H 1 (r OBU jjTS 2 , U OBU ). OBU also computes the shared key K vÀr = Pk g r OBU . Thus, we can get the computation cost of AAAS in V2I authentication (CC AAASÀV 2I ) is
In AAAS' V2V authentication, OBU first generates the ISGS signature as
Then OBU verifies the ISGS signature as a = e(V j, 2 Pk g , Q V j ), b = e(A j , V j B j ), and g = e(A j , H(Pk g jjTS j , A j )) and checks the equation b? = ag. We can thus get that computation cost of AAAS in V2V authentication (CC AAASÀV 2V ) is
In V2I authentication of CPAS, OBU generates the digital signature as
In addition, OBU verifies the signature generated from RSU as h R = H 1 (ID R , T R ) and
While during the V2V authentication of CPAS, OBU generates the signature as h i = H 1 (PID i , T i ) and h
Afterward, OBU checks the equation e(V i , P)? = e(h i P pub + h 0 ih i T i , Q) Á e(U i , Q 0 ). Therefore, the computation cost of CPAS in V2V authentication (CC CPASÀV 2V ) is
In the V2I authentication of ACPN, OBU generates a pseudonym as PS v = TimejjE PK (ID v )jjHRjjRSU, where ID v is encrypted by RSA. OBU generates the IBS signature as r = e(P 1 , P), v = h(m, r), and u = v Á S I D + kP 1 . Then OBU verifies the IBS signature twice as r = e(u, P) Á e(H(ID), À Q T A) and checks the equation v = h(m, r). Hence, we can obtain that the computation cost of ACPN in V2I authentication (CC ACPNÀV 2I ) is
During V2V authentication of ACPN, OBU generates the online signature as s = H 1 (m, R)x + r and verifies the online/offline signature (S, s, R) as checking the equation e(P pub , S)? = e(sP Á H 1 (m, R)R, Q ID ). We can thus obtain that the computation cost of ACPN in V2V authentication (CC ACPNÀV 2V ) is
During V2I authentication of PACP, OBU generates an IBS signature and verifies the signature from RSU. In addition, OBU executes the encryption and decryption operation as
However, the author does not give the specific IBS mechanism, in order to take the objective analysis between AAAS and PACP, we assume that the IBS in PACP is CC signature mechanism. Hence, it is easy to get that the computation cost of PACP in V2I authentication (CC PACPÀV 2I ) is
In the V2V authentication of PACP, OBU do the same encryption and decryption operations as that in V2I authentication. Besides, OBU generates a BonehLynn-Shacham (BLS) signature and verifies the BLS signature from RSU. To sign and verify a BLS signature, OBU executes 1 hash-to-point operations, 1 point multiplication operations, 1 hash-to-point operations, and 2 bilinear pairing operations. Therefore, we can get the computation cost of PACP in V2V authentication (CC PACPÀV 2V ) is
To illustrate the better performance of the proposed AAAS scheme in the V2I and V2V authentication, we compare the computation cost of AAAS in V2I and V2V authentications with CPAS, ACPN, and PACP as shown in Table 3 . According to the results, it is obviously that the AAAS scheme we proposed owes lower computation cost compared to the other three in V2I authentication. While during V2V authentication, the AAAS scheme has lower computation cost compared with CPAS, PACP, but slightly higher than ACPN. Furthermore, the total computation cost of the proposed AAAS scheme is lower than CPAS, ACPN, and PACP.
Transmission overhead
The transmission overhead is analyzed by the size of total messages transmitted during V2I and V2V authentication procedures. For ease of description, the following assumptions are given out in Table 4 with size of p is 64 bytes and p is 20 bytes.
AAAS: during V2I authentication, OBU receives fd 1 , R ID , Pk g , TS 1 g from RSU and sends fc, d 2 , r OBU P, TS 2 g to RSU, where
and V ID is the identity of RSU and OBU. While In the V2V authentication of AAAS, OBU i sends fd 3 , TS i , V i , Pk g g to OBU j and receives fd 4 , TS j , V j , Pk g g from OBU j , where
, and TS 2 are the time stamps. We can thus obtain the transmission overhead of AAAS in V2V authentication (TO AAASÀV 2V ) is TO AAASÀV 2V = 40 3 6 + 128 3 4 + 4 3 2 = 760 bytes ð10Þ In the period of V2V authentication of PACP, OBU sends hPN j , s j i and receives hPN i , s i i from another OBU, where PN j =hs
Comparison with CPAS, ACPN, and PACP, the proposed AAAS scheme has the lower transmission overhead in both V2I and V2V authentication as shown in Table 5 .
Serving ratio
During V2I authentication, RSU provides service for OBU. To weigh the capability of RSU providing service for OBU, we denote it as the serving ratio. In order to compare the serving ratio of RSU providing access service for vehicles of different schemes in the V2I communication, we give some symbols and parameters as shown in Table 6 .
We borrow the approach from 12 for the analysis of serving ratio below
where E(X ) stands for the expectation of the average number of access service requests, which is represented as The density of vehicles under one RSU varies from 100 to 400 r The probability for one OBU to apply for access service B(d, r)
The Binomial distribution X The number of requesting OBUs, which follows B(d, r) T k
The computation cost on RSU and OBU side in V2I authentication RSU: roadside unit; OBU: on-board unit.
To weigh the capability of serving for OBU, we assume the maximal number of access services that the RSU can provide as S max , the vehicle average speed is v, the RSU valid wireless communication coverage range is R range as well as the computation cost (T k ). Hence, we define
Thus, the number of completed access services denoted as S cas is S cas = S req , if S req S max S max , otherwise ð21Þ
Therefore, the serving ratio (S ratio ) is defined as
Then, S ratio can be measured by Finally, the comparison of serving ratio is given among the schemes as Figures 6 and 7 . From the results, it is obvious to get that AAAS has better performance in serving ratio with the increasing vehicle speed and vehicle density. Besides, the serving ratio will be lower with increasing computation cost on RSU side. However, in the future, with the rapid development of edge computing, the computation on RSU side will have a sharp decline to improve serving ratio.
Conclusion
In this article, we combine the edge computing with VANETs and propose a novel AAAS for VANETs under edge computing that focus on preserving privacy and improving the access authentication efficiency. We adopt the ISGS mechanism to effectively protect the privacy of users in both V2I and V2V authentication procedures. The reputation mechanism is also introduced to identify and revoke malicious nodes. The security of the authentication protocols is proved by SVO logic. Compared with other typical schemes, the proposed scheme owns better performance.
However, the proposed scheme does not provide a fine solution to the preservation of user's location privacy. In the future research, we will concentrate on this issue to pave the way for the wide deployment of VANETs. Besides, we will explore more efficient group signature mechanisms (such as IBV 38 ) and a new cryptography mechanism to improve the efficiency of anonymous authentication.
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